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John T. Addison, Claus Schnabel, Joachim Wagner* 
German Industrial Relations: An Elusive Exemplar** 
 
The German system of industrial relations has long held a certain cachet outside 
that country. Recently, economists have joined its diverse group of supporters, noting 
in particular the potential efficiency benefits of the dual system. In the present paper, 
we investigate what has been learned about the effects of unionization and works 
councils on firm performance, and attempt to draw some lessons of wider 
application. We can find little evidence to suggest that these institutions are in 
practice associated with enhanced performance. For both this reason and the likely 
non-portability of German institutions, we would conclude that the notion that 
German industrial relations provide an exemplar to which others should aspire is 
premature at best. 
 
Das deutsche System der industriellen Beziehungen genießt im Ausland seit 
langem einen guten Ruf. Zu den Befürwortern gehören seit kurzem auch Ökonomen, 
die insbesondere die potentiellen Effizienzvorteile des dualen Systems hervorheben. 
Im vorliegenden Beitrag untersuchen die Autoren, welche Wirkungen von 
Gewerkschaften und Betriebsräten auf die Unternehmensleistungen ausgehen und 
versuchen, daraus Schlüsse für die weitergehende Anwendungen zu ziehen. Es lassen 
sich wenig empirische Belege dafür finden, daß diese Institutionen mit verbesserten 
Unternehmensleistungen einhergehen. Deshalb, und weil die deutschen Institutionen 
kaum übertragbar zu sein scheinen, schlußfolgern die Autoren, daß eine Haltung, die 
dem deutschen System industrieller Beziehungen eine Vorbildfunktion für andere 
Länder zuweist, bestenfalls als verfrüht einzustufen ist. 
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1. Introduction 
Today it is fashionable in international circles to look with favor upon the 
German industrial relations system. For example, it would appear to be the case that 
the European Commission has had Germany in mind as some sort of template in 
designing those of its social policy initiatives with a bearing on worker information, 
consultation, and participation rights. Whatever the theoretical attraction of the 
German "model," the fact remains that relatively little is known about the economic 
performance of industrial relations institutions in that country, even if from the 
perspective of strikes they fit the description of being "concertative." 
The present exercise focuses on such considerations. Specifically, we shall 
examine the impact of unions and works councils in a largely micro context, thus 
eschewing comparative analysis on the covariation of concertative institutions and 
macroeconomic outcomes such as unemployment and growth. Our goal is to ascertain 
what has been learned about the efficiency of German unions and works councils and 
to detect if there are indeed any obvious lessons of wider application. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin by sketching in some theoretical 
detail to provide perspective on the role of worker representation in general, and to 
signal any characteristics that may differentiate German institutions. There follows a 
review of the German evidence, focusing on productivity, profitability, and 
investments in physical and intangible capital. Mention is made of the international 
experience along these performance indicators only en passant. We then take stock 
and question the potential for grafting German-type institutions on to other systems. 
A brief section concludes. 
2. Theoretical Conjectures 
The conventional neoclassical model views unions as distortionary elements - 
literally, combinations in restraint of trade. On this view, not only do unions cause 
disemployment (and output losses) as unionized firms move up their demand curve 
for labor in response to the union wage premium but they also waste resources in 
establishing and maintaining their monopoly prices or rents. Although the effect on 
capital usage is indeterminate, being the net outcome of substitution and scale effects, 
the misallocation of resources is not in doubt: too few workers are employed in the 
union sector and too many in the nonunion sector. Additional losses in output occur if 
workers shed from the union sector fail to find employment elsewhere. To this 
outcome it is less formally argued that there will be further output losses associated 
with union work rules and strikes. 
Much early work was devoted to calculating the losses in output. This research 
suggested that the inefficient use of labor resulting from unions was but a tiny 
proportion of GDP. However, the estimates could be materially inflated by taking 
account of the resources expended by unions in erecting and preserving the 
differential, by allowing for wage rigidities which limit the absorption of surplus 
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labor shed from the union sector, and by making various assumptions about the costs 
of the union rule book.1 
But, as is well known, the debate has long moved on. First, an important and 
primarily empirical literature has suggested that union regimes may in practice be 
associated with higher productivity due to union-induced changes in the workplace. 
This newer empirical literature has its intellectual roots in the "collective voice" 
model of Freeman and Medoff (1984). Given an appropriate response from 
management, it is argued that unions lower turnover and establish more effective 
governance structures in work places characterized by public goods (i.e. shared 
working conditions), complementarities in production, and long-term contractual 
relationships. As we shall see, rather awkward results from separate profitability 
studies (that universally pointed to lower profitability in union regimes), and very 
mixed results from a very large number of (largely U.S.) productivity studies 
spawned by the collective voice model, shifted attention away from productivity 
effects and toward a consideration of unionism's longer-term consequences.2 This 
new literature in part reflects a second challenge to the simple neoclassical model. In 
a nutshell, that model appears to be deficient in that it ignores the technical point that 
union settlements on the demand curve may not be efficient. If unions and 
management bargain simultaneously over wages and employment - rather than the 
union setting the wage and the firm adjusting employment by moving up its demand 
curve, as in the monopoly union model - it can be shown that outcomes on the 
demand curve are unlikely to be Pareto optimal (McDonald and Solow, 1981). That is 
to say, for any given wage-employment combination on the demand curve there 
generally exists some combination off that curve with lower wages and greater 
employment that is preferred by both the union and the firm since it affords the 
former higher utility and the latter higher profit. These preferred and "efficient" 
settlements are located on a so-called contract curve. It is conventional to identify a 
strong efficiency case that corresponds to a vertical contract curve. In this special 
case, the union has no real effects: output, prices, capital investment, and employment 
are identical to the competitive (i.e. union-free) case. The parties may thus be 
envisaged as maximizing the total value of the enterprise and then bargaining over 
the division of the surplus. A reduction in profit, the firm's share, vis-à-vis the 
competitive outcome, coupled with little or no measured effect on productivity is thus 
quite consistent with internal efficiency. Indeed, this is one possible interpretation of 
the balance of the empirical literature noted in the previous paragraph. 
But to complicate matters this cooperative bargaining scenario is by no means 
the end of the story. First, there is no guarantee that actual outcomes will lie on the 
contract curve. But abstracting from this, and assuming cooperative behavior, there is 
                                                          
1 The most recent estimates of the efficiency losses associated with the union wage premium 
are provided by DeFina (1983). See also Hirsch and Addison (1986, Chapter 7). 
2 For a review of the U.S. evidence, see Addison and Hirsch (1989) and Hirsch (1991).  The 
more limited U.K. findings are surveyed in Metcalf (1990, 1993). 
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the issue of union effects over the long run, since the basic model we have just 
described holds capital constant. No investment distortions are implied if bargaining 
is completely cooperative. In such cases, collective bargaining will again maximize 
the joint surplus of the enterprise, comprising the (present value) of shareholder 
returns and union rents (namely, the excess of union over nonunion remuneration). 
All that will be observed is redistribution, with the union premium taking the form of 
a lump-sum tax. But note that fully cooperative collective bargaining requires 
contracts that are binding over long intervals and that the union evaluate its utility 
over a time span that is identical to that over which the firm evaluates its future 
returns. Although it is possible to reconcile the reality of, say, annual contracts with a 
long-term contractual relationship in the sense that (infinitely) repeated bargains may 
lead to cooperative outcomes, the other part of the problem - different time horizons - 
still remains. These may be expected to diverge, being shorter for the union for two 
main reasons: first, since union members do not have ownership rights in the union 
they will not take into account the interests of future union members (i.e. they cannot 
sell their union cards); second, and relatedly, the union median voter who is likely to 
decide policy may be expected to be a relatively senior worker, which will further 
shorten the time horizon of the union. To make matters more concrete, the distortions 
we have in mind stem from the tendency of the union to attempt to appropriate the 
quasi-rents to firm-specific, long-lived capital that form the normal returns to such 
capital. (Note that we do not refer to the quasi-rents arising from the market power of 
the firm, appropriation of which is neutral from an efficiency perspective.) 
Confronted by this risk, the rational firm will logically respond by reducing these 
investments. So although the bargaining relation may be described as cooperative, it 
may not be fully cooperative and unions may still be distortionary and affect long-run 
behavior relative to the nonunion outcome. To quote Hirsch (1992, 100): "Although 
efficient (cooperative) contracting in this situation maximizes the sum of owner and 
union member "wealth," rational union myopia results in lower investment than 
obtains in a nonunion firm, shifting returns more heavily toward the present and away 
from the heavily discounted future." 
The distortions are of course more profound and obvious where bargaining is 
non-cooperative ab initio. But, to repeat, even in cooperative bargaining situations 
there will also be reduced investment in long-lived, firm-specific capital if, as is 
likely, the time horizons of unions and shareholders differ.3 
Various suggestions have been made on how to reduce the union tax on 
investment. These include such devices as profit-related pay, employee stock 
ownership, and the development of long-run bargaining protocols. Another solution 
that has commended itself is of course deregulation. Abstracting from the latter, 
perhaps draconian solution, many observers would point to the more fundamental 
                                                          
3 For a novel, but ultimately unsatisfactory, empirical treatment of the role of discounting in 
influencing cooperative bargaining behavior, see Kahn (1993). For an accessible formal 
treatment of investment under unionism, see Addison and Chilton (1995). 
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need for good industrial relations and concertative or participative institutions - which 
may themselves have to be mandated. 
One such institution is the works council, the theoretical function of which is to 
promote labor-management cooperation with the goal of increasing the size of the 
economic pie, and to foster forward-looking behavior on the part of workers. 
Recalling our preceding analysis, works councils are also the classic instrument of 
collective voice. The benefits of the works council along the dimensions of 
information, consultation and participation have recently been restated by Freeman 
and Lazear (1993). Although the authors' arguments will be elaborated upon in 
section IV, three strands of their treatment might usefully be identified here. First, it 
is argued that if consultation is to achieve creative solutions there must also be 
participation or codetermination, even if this is achieved at the price of some delay in 
decision-making.4 Second, works councils will either not be provided or 
under-provided in the market despite their efficiency properties. This market failure 
argument has also been applied to participative institutions more generally by Levine 
and Tyson (1990) in a different model emphasizing the prisoner's dilemma.5 Third, it 
is argued that the power of the works council should be bounded in some way, since 
workers might be expected to seek more power than is socially optimal. Interestingly, 
the German works council fits the bill in each of these respects, which might imply 
that we would be able to detect productivity enhancing effects in the German data. 
From this brief review of the theory, it is apparent that the efficiency case 
against unions is not black and white and that there may even be a presumption in 
favor of works councils under certain circumstances. Much must be remitted to the 
level of the empirical evidence, to which we next turn. But we would caution that this 
evidence does not address the portability of German institutions, which should be 
viewed as a distinctly different issue. 
3. The Empirical Evidence for Germany 
German evidence on the impact of worker representation on economic outcomes 
is less comprehensive than that for the United States. The bulk of the German 
                                                          
4 This emphasis upon participation is also the hallmark of the recent literature examining the 
effectiveness of profit sharing and employee stock ownership plans.  For a review, see the 
essays in Blinder (1990). 
5 Levine and Tyson argue that if all firms adopted participative machinery all would benefit 
through higher productivity.  But participatory firms require, among other things, compressed 
wage structures to encourage group cohesiveness and dismissals protection to lengthen the 
time horizon of workers.  " Traditional" firms, on the other hand, are said to motivate through 
the fear of unemployment and a sharply differentiated wage structure.  The emergence of the 
participative firm may thus be prejudiced by adverse selection (it will attract the work-shy) 
and by an externality (the poaching of the participative firm's most productive workers by 
traditional firms who can pay more). Without some participation mandate (or perhaps just-
cause statute), so the argument runs, the market will be systematically biased against 
participatory work places and the economy can become locked in a socially suboptimal 
position. 
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literature relates to productivity and innovation effects. The evidence pertaining to 
profitability is much more sketchy, and there is almost no information on investments 
in physical capital. The distinctive element of the German research is that it contains 
data on formal plant-based institutions, although the relationship between 
unionization and works councils remains unsettled.  
(i) Unions and Productivity 
Most studies of the effect of unions on productivity have made use of the 
unions-in-the-production-function test, suggested by Brown and Medoff (1978). This 
test involves estimating a modified Cobb-Douglas production function across firms 
and industries with different levels of unionism. The dependent variable is either 
value-added per employee or (preferably) physical output per unit of labor. The 
independent variables include the capital-labor ratio (to take account of the 
substitution of capital for labor as firms react to union pay premia by moving up their 
labor demand curves), other controls (such as establishment size), and of course a 
measure of union density and/or a dummy variable picking up the union status of the 
individual worker. A positive coefficient estimate for the unionism variable is taken 
as prima facie evidence that unions have net beneficial effects on productivity, and 
conversely.6 
Three of the studies cited in Table 1 have followed this basic approach. In fitting 
a time-series variant of the Brown-Medoff production function to economy-wide data 
for 1955-84, Schnabel (1989) obtains a negative coefficient on his union measure. 
But the coefficient estimate is scarcely different from zero (t-ratio=-1.6). Moreover, 
its magnitude is tiny: a 1 percentage point increase in union density is estimated to 
lead to a reduction in productivity of less than 0.003 percent. A similar directional 
effect of much the same size is reported in the cross-section study of Addison, 
Genosko, and Schnabel (1989) and this time the coefficient estimate is patently 
insignificant - a result also found in another cross-section study by Lorenz and 
Wagner (1989). 
The conclusion from these studies that unionism - as measured by union density 
- has if anything a modest, retarding effect on productivity, although it casts some 
doubt on the basic Freeman-Medoff thesis, must remain tentative for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, a slew of statistical difficulties cloud interpretation of the 
findings. These include problems of simultaneity, selectivity, aggregation and 
specification, and limitations of the data and control variables. And since differences 
in technology, management quality, and other (often unobservable) factors between 
unionized industries and firms industries cannot be adequately represented in the 
estimating equations, it is clearly difficult to disentangle the direct effects of 
unionism from its indirect effects (stemming from management response) or from the 
influence of other determinants of productivity. 
Table 1: Analysis of the Effects of Worker Representation on Productivity in western Germany 
                                                          
6 On the mechanics of the test, see, inter al., Addison and Chilton (1993). 
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________________________________________________________________________________ 
Study Sample/data Productivity Union indicator   Union effect 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
FitzRoy and  61/62 small and medium-sized total factor presence of a negative 
Kraft (1987) firms in the metal-working  productivity works council (positive) 
 industry1977/79  (union density) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Schnabel (1989) economy-wide, time-series labour productivity union density negative (but 
  analysis for 1955-84 (GDP per employee)  statistically  
    weak) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Addison, 30 industries organised by 12 labour productivity union density insignificant  
Genosko, and different trade unions, 1983 (value added per   (negative) 
Schnabel (1989)  employee) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Lorenz and 29 manufacturing industries, labour productivity union density negative (but 
Wagner (1989) 1985 (value added per   statistically 
  employee)  weak) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Kraft (1992) 20 industries organized by 6 growth rate of total union density negative 
 different rade unions, 1970-87 factor productivity 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Addison, Kraft, 49 firms in two Länder, total factor productivity presence of a  positive (but 
Wagner (1993) 1990/91  works council statistically 
    weak) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the second place, our earlier theoretical remarks have indicated that, if there is 
efficient bargaining, we should not expect output and employment (and hence 
productivity) in the union sector to diverge in the short run from that in the nonunion 
sector. The muted effects of German unions are not inconsistent with this position, if 
not the basic collective voice model. But thirdly, and more fundamentally, it might 
reasonably be argued that the essentially "American" hand-me-down flavor of these 
tests perforce does not take account of the institutional peculiarities of the dual 
industrial relations system in Germany. Specifically, the narrow focus on unions per 
se ignores the role of the works council which is the voice of labor at the plant level, 
providing not only a formal and continuous channel of labor-management 
communication and cooperation but also, through its participative or codetermination 
functions, a power to oppose many managerial decisions. For both reasons, positive 
and negative, it is the works council rather than the union that might be expected to 
have the more decisive influence on productivity. In the words of FitzRoy and Kraft 
(1987, 494-95): "If a significant efficiency-voice effect is anywhere plausible, then it 
is surely in the practice of the works council ... in West Germany." 
FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) were the first to attempt to isolate the effect of works 
councils on productivity, using two years of data on small and medium-sized firms in 
the metal-working industry - the mean establishment size of their sample is 600 
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employees.7 They employ two worker representation indicators - union density and a 
dummy variable indicating the presence or otherwise of a works council8 - together 
with an extensive set of firm controls. FitzRoy and Kraft provide simultaneous-
equation estimates of total factor productivity (measured as the residuals from a 
three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function) and the probability of observing a 
works council, and not the usual single-equation specification. In other words, the 
authors seek to model the presence or otherwise of a works council (i.e. endogenize 
works council status) in conjunction with the determinants of productivity that 
include the works council. They report that the coefficient estimate for the works 
council variable in the productivity equation is negative and significant, while that for 
the productivity measure in the jointly estimated equation capturing the probability of 
observing a works council is positive and significant. By contrast, the union density 
measure is positive in both equations, significantly so in the productivity equation. In 
short, purged of any feedback effect from productivity to works council status, the 
presence of a works council is associated with reduced firm performance, while the 
broader worker representation variable (belonging to a union) is associated with 
improved performance. 
FitzRoy and Kraft find this evidence to be consistent with their management 
push/managerial competence model (first articulated in FitzRoy and Kraft, 1985). 
Hard-driving managers are said to elicit more output from their workers and are 
rewarded with higher salaries and profits. The workers react by joining a union, 
which outcome results in the positive relation between productivity and union density 
noted earlier. They are also more likely to elect a works council - both for protection 
and to obtain a compensating wage differential for their greater effort. Independently, 
by limiting managerial flexibility, works councils have an adverse effect on 
productivity; or, expressed another way, better managers can avoid the threat of a 
works council by offering better conditions and alternative channels of 
communication. 
FitzRoy and Kraft's argument that the existence of a permanent works council 
with extensive legal and other powers should have at least as much influence as union 
representation and periodic collective bargaining outside the firm if the collective 
voice model is valid now appears to be accepted by all sides in the ongoing debate 
over what it is that unions do. Despite reservations as to the representativeness of 
                                                          
7 The firms in FitzRoy and Kraft's sample range in size from 10 to 6,000 workers. The authors 
acknowledge that their results cannot directly be generalized to large firms, by which they 
would seem to mean that their model cannot directly be tested in a sample made up of 
exclusively of large firms with near universal works council coverage. 
8 It is widely believed outside of Germany that works councils are automatic, subject to the 
plant having five or more permanent employees.  In fact, they are a right German workers 
may exercise if they so choose.  In the sample of firms used by FitzRoy and Kraft some 80% 
have a works council.  This value is well above the average for German industry of 24% 
reported by Frick and Sadowski (1993), which inevitably raises questions as to the 
representativeness of the results reported below. 
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their results, alternative explanations to fit the awkward facts uncovered by FitzRoy 
and Kraft have not been forthcoming however. And more recent analyses at the firm 
level do not exactly resuscitate the collective voice model, at least for this outcome 
indicator. Thus, although Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993) obtain a positive 
coefficient estimate for the works council dummy in a single-equation specification 
of the correlates of total factor productivity for their sample of 50 or so 
manufacturing firms, that estimate fails to achieve significance at conventional levels. 
(Other aspects of this study are reviewed below.)  
To our knowledge, just two studies have attempted to peer inside the black-box 
of worker representation (pro)productivity mechanisms. They reach opposite 
conclusions. In the first such study, Kraft (1986) reports that it is individual rather 
than collective voice that reduces voluntary turnover in his sample of 123 
metal-working firms. Individual voice refers to the decision rights of individual 
(blue-collar) workers "on investment and rationalization, co-ordination of work 
groups, and other personnel decisions, and the determination of the (individual) job 
design" (Kraft, 1986, 702). The variable was constructed by the author from 
categorical responses from management concerning the degree of worker 
involvement in these areas. Collective voice, on the other hand, is captured by a 
works council dummy variable, and presumably to a lesser extent by union density. 
Note that the dependent variable used in this study is not a continuous measure of 
voluntary turnover but rather a dummy capturing "high quit rates," again derived on 
the basis of management responses - 37% of firms in the sample claimed to have high 
quit rates. Kraft's single-equation probit estimates of the determinants of high quit 
rates suggest that turnover is sharply reduced the greater the opportunities for the 
expression of individual voice, but neither the works council nor the union density 
variable is statistically significant. These results are not disturbed when the author 
uses simultaneous systems of equations; indeed, the role of individual voice is both 
strengthened and better determined.  
In the second study, Frick and Sadowski (1993) examine actual quit rates for a 
much larger sample of firms (n=1, 616), taken from the Büchtemann-Höland (1989) 
data base. Using a single-equation specification, Frick and Sadowski report a strongly 
significant negative association between presence of a works council and quit rates: 
other things being equal, firms with a works council have quit rates that are 2.4 
percentage points lower than those of their counterparts without workplace 
representation. For its part, union density is statistically insignificant. 
As was noted earlier, debate on the impact of worker representation has moved 
on from an investigation of static effects toward a consideration of its effects on 
long-run performance. One such indicator is productivity growth. (Others are 
examined below.) In the only extant German study, Kraft (1992) examines the 
relationship between unionization and the growth in total factor productivity, using 
pooled data on 20 industries for the sample period 1970-87. Union density is found to 
be associated with significantly slower growth. Statistical problems are such, 
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however, that Kraft (1992, 430) concludes only that "a negative impact is more 
plausible than a positive one."9 
The statistical difficulties alluded to by Kraft are real. In addition to the standard 
difficulties mentioned earlier that confront all analyses of productivity data, German 
studies typically suffer from the problems of very small sample sizes at both the 
micro and industry levels, and indeed an absence of official data on union density at 
the latter more aggregative level. The assumptions made by analysts in round-about 
calculations of union density doubtless influence, albeit in an unknown way, the 
results obtained in the productivity studies. 
Overall, subject to these caveats, there is little in the productivity literature to 
suggest that works councils taken in conjunction with the institutional framework in 
which they are embedded - viewed by many as a near ideal environment for the 
expression of collective voice - have beneficial net effects on productivity. The 
studies cited in Table 1 have typically reported that the direct effects of worker 
representation are insignificant or negative. From the perspective of the standard 
collective voice model, then, the suggestion is that whatever the positive effects of 
unionism these appear to be counterbalanced and perhaps outweighed by traditional 
monopoly effects. But, to repeat, these are (with one exception) static effects. We 
now turn to examine whether the longer-term effects are any more favorable. 
 
 
(ii) Unions and Innovation 
Results of studies investigating the effects of worker representation on 
innovative activity are summarized in Table 2. The industry-level studies of 
Schulenburg and Wagner (1991) and Schnabel and Wagner (1992a) report an absence 
of any statistically significant relation between union density and innovative activity 
at this level of aggregation. This basic result holds across various model 
specifications and for different definitions of the dependent variable. (As shown in 
the table, the industry-level innovation measures comprise the percentage of revenues 
spent on R&D, the percentage of employees working on R&D, and the proportion of 
total shipments made up of new products.) 
Table 2: Analysis of the Effects of Worker Representation on Innovation in western Germany 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          
9 Since Kraft's results have often been misinterpreted, some additional remarks are in order.  
Apart from the union density variable, Kraft also employs dummy variables identifying 
particular unions.  For two of these unions - IG Metall and IG Chemie - positive and 
statistically significant coefficient estimates are obtained.  But this finding does not indicate 
that these two unions are associated with higher growth.  To the contrary, the magnitude of 
the coefficient estimates for these two union dummies is insufficient to overturn the overall 
negative impact of union density.  In other words, all that this particular result informs us is 
that for IG Metall and IG Chemie the negative effects on growth are less negative than for 
other unions. 
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Study Sample/data Innovation measure Union indicator Union effect 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
FitzRoy and 57 small and proportion of sales interaction of union organized labour significantly 
Kraft(1990) medium-sized consisting of products density and presence reduces innovative activity 
 firms in the metal- introduced within the of a works council 
 working industry,  last five years  
 1979 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Schulenburg 29 industries, percentage of percentage of female unionization is negatively 
and Wagner 1982/83 shipments in the employees (inverse related to innovative activity in 
(1991)  market entry phase proxy for union numerous specifications, but 
   density) this effect is not statistically 
    significant in 3SLS estimates 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Schnabel 29 manufacturing i) R&D expenditures estimate of union unionization does not 
and Wagner industries,1984/85    /sales density employees significantly affect innovative 
(1992a)  ii) percentage of  activity 
    employees working 
    in R&D 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Schnabel 78 manufacturing dummy variable for i) presence of a union indicators do not 
and Wagner firms,1990/91 introduction of a new    works council  significantly affect innovative 
(1992b)  product in 1989 ii) average percentage activity after controlling for 
     value of wage drift firm size 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Schnabel i) 26 industries, R&D expenditures i) estimate of union i) unionization does not significantly 
and Wagner    1983/84 /sales    density    affect innovative activity 
(1993) ii) 31 manu-  ii) union density; ii) unionization and presence of 
    facturing firms,     presence of a    works council positively 
    1990/91     works council    related to R&D activity only  
       if less than about half of the  
       employees are union mem- 
       bers, negatively otherwise 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Rather different results are reported by FitzRoy and Kraft (1990) on the basis of 
firm-level data - results that are consistent with their findings on productivity, 
reviewed earlier. In a break with past practice, the authors use a worker representation 
measure that is a composite of union density and presence of a works council. The 
continuous union density measure is interacted with the works council dummy 
variable on the grounds that greater density is associated with a higher probability of 
observing a works council and that the latter is more influential when the workforce 
is more highly organized. It is found for this sample of small firms that the composite 
worker representation variable is negatively associated with the innovation measure, 
namely, the proportion of sales consisting of products introduced in the last five 
years. Interestingly, there is no evidence of any positive feedback from innovative 
activity to worker representation in the authors' simultaneous equation estimates - 
which one might have anticipated on rent-seeking grounds. 
FitzRoy and Kraft also note that, taken in isolation, union density is negatively 
and significantly associated with their innovation measure - though they do not report 
corresponding results for the works council dummy entered as a separate regressor. 
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Using data for a larger and more recent sample of firms (but with a less 
comprehensive set of controls) and different measures of innovation and worker 
representation, Schnabel and Wagner (1992b) find evidence of a well-determined 
positive impact of union influence at the plant level. But this result is highly sensitive 
to specification: as shown in Table 2, this beneficial impact of plant-level unionism 
abruptly vanishes once a control for firm size is added. 
The final innovation study considered here uses a common specification applied 
to both industry and firm data. Schnabel and Wagner (1993) find no statistically 
significant effect of union density (constructed from union membership functions 
estimated from a large sample of micro data) on R&D intensity for their 26-industry 
sample. At the establishment level, however, union density appears to exert a strongly 
negative effect on innovative activity, whereas the presence of a works council is 
associated with higher R&D intensity. Arguing that the works council dummy 
variable may be also viewed as an indicator of union density, the authors use the 
coefficient estimates for the two measures of worker representation to provide a 
simple calculation of the critical level of union density at which the beneficial impact 
of a works council union is lost. This occurs at a level of workplace organization of 
51 percent. In short, the argument is that "some" unionism, taken in conjunction with 
works council presence, is productive of innovative activity but that "too much" 
unionism is harmful. 
German literature with a bearing on intangible capital formation again yields a 
mixed bag of results. The industry level findings are perhaps the least informative. 
And, at the disaggregative level, there is some evident disagreement between the firm 
studies. One obvious difficulty is the role of inadequate controls in exercises where 
works council status is not endogenized, while data limitations and identification 
problems inevitably weaken the attempts to model that status. Differences in results 
may in part reflect the distribution of firm size in the various samples. But there is 
also one tenuous line of possible agreement, concerning the role of unionism proper: 
higher union density in conjunction with works council presence may produce 
unfavorable outcomes. That said, the mechanisms producing this result have not 
formally been addressed. Analysis of the interrelationship between the two types of 
workplace representation, however, is less pressing than the need for larger and 
preferably longitudinal data sets and the development of a much richer set of 
controls.10 
                                                          
10 For completeness, we should perhaps also note a recent study by Warnken and Ronning 
(1990) that finds evidence of a positive association between the percentage of workers 
covered by collective agreements protecting employees against loss of income due to 
technological change (including both Kündigungsschutz and Verdienstsicherungsabkommen) 
and investment in high-technology equipment.  In particular, changes in innovation 
(comparing 1984/85 with 1979/80) are reported to be much higher in sectors with a high 
degree of protection (defined as 30% coverage) than in those with medium (10-20%) or low 
(<10%) protection:  the corresponding changes in innovation are 37.88, 17.56, and 21.72%, 
respectively.  But the suggestion that such agreements have led to the introduction of new 
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Finally, there is almost no evidence of union impact on tangible capital 
formation with which to provide possible points of contact with the innovation 
literature. (Recall that a rent-seeking model would suggest similar union impacts on 
both tangible and intangible capital.) The only evidence of which we are aware is 
contained in the study by Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993), encountered earlier 
(see Table 1). The authors report that firms with a works council have significantly 
lower gross (but not net) investment in relation to capital stock, other things being 
equal. The suggestion that works councils adversely affect of investments in physical 
capital must be treated with some caution, however, both because of the standard 
statistical problems cited earlier and the weak overall performance of the authors' 
investment equations. 
(iii) Unions and Profitability 
Unionism may lower investments in physical and intangible capital through the 
indirect route of reduced profits, if such profits provide a low-cost source of funds for 
investment. And there is every indication for the U.S. of both direct and indirect 
effects. For example Hirsch's (1991) results suggest that unionized companies invest 
some 20 percent less in physical capital than do otherwise similar nonunion 
companies; one half of this impact is calculated to be the direct effect of the union tax 
on the returns to such capital, and one half to reflect the lower current profits among 
unionized companies. (A similar overall impact is also found for intangible capital, 
but here the direct effect dominates the profits effect.) 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the consequences of German unions for 
profitability. In a cross-section analysis of industry data for 1983, Mainusch (1992) 
finds a statistically significant negative relation between an industry's profit rate and 
its level of union density. In separate specifications, the coefficient estimate for a 
measure of market concentration (specifically, a Herfindahl index) interacted with 
union density is significantly negative. Mainusch's strong results are subject to the 
important caveat that they are derived from a very parsimonious specification, raising 
the usual difficulties associated with omitted variables. 
There are but two firm-level studies. Although they report that works councils 
appear to retard investment in physical capital, Addison, Kraft, and Wagner (1993) 
can find no evidence of a reduction in firm profitability. The negative coefficient 
estimate for presence of a works council is not statistically different from zero. But 
again the authors' results are obtained from single-equation estimates. 
Only FitzRoy and Kraft (1985) provide estimates from a fully simultaneous 
system of equations. Indeed, they offer a four-equation system in which the 
endogenous variables are hourly wages, percent of the workforce unionized, firm 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
technology should be resisted, not least because causation might easily run in the opposite 
direction.  More formally, multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of innovative 
activity is required and the sample period should be extended to cover intervals when such 
agreements were not in operation.  As part and parcel of this exercise, one important issue 
that has to be addressed is whether these agreements are synonymous with unionism. 
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profitability, and salaries. The system of equations are estimated over pooled data for 
1977 and 1979 for a sample of 61/62 firms. The basic finding is that union density is 
positively and significantly associated with hourly wages, salaries, and profitability, 
while exactly opposite results are found for works councils. This evidence is of 
course consistent with the authors' managerial pressure/managerial competence story, 
encountered earlier. The bottom line, therefore, is again that unionism is akin to an 
intervening variable, while the potentially corrosive influence of the works council - 
on company profits and threats to management salaries - can be side-stepped through 
the device of adequate alternative systems of communication and higher wages. 
Once again, only FitzRoy and Kraft are able to tell a more or less consistent 
story, though there is still the issue of the representativeness of their results. 
4. Lessons of Wider Application? 
At the outset, we noted that aspects of the German system of worker 
representation are the subject of much international interest, even perhaps more so 
than its training system (which is of course not to suggest that the latter can be 
divorced from the "system" of industrial relations). Two practical examples and one 
piece of applied theoretical work might usefully be cited as indicative of this interest. 
First, there is every suggestion that the Dunlop Commission,11 charged with 
examining the state of U.S. worker-management relations, will recommend 
something akin to the German works council in its final report to be issued in 
December 1994.12 Note that any such recommendation will require changes in U.S. 
labor law and, in particular to sections 8(a)2 and 2(11) of the National Labor 
Relations Act. This would therefore represent a nontrivial development. 
The interest of the European Commission is yet longer-lived. It should be 
recalled that in 1975 an amended version of the 1970 draft regulation on the statute 
for a European Company provided for employee representation on obligatory 
supervisory boards of companies or those organizations that elected to form a 
"European Company." As full board members, employee representatives would 
participate in all matters concerning the management and progress of the company, as 
dealt with by the supervisory board. In addition, the draft legislation also called for 
directly elected European Works Councils (EWCs). The management board was to 
meet regularly with its EWC to report among other things on the economic and 
financial position of the company, the investment program, new working methods, 
and rationalization plans. The EWC was also to be consulted on job evaluation and 
piecework rates. And it had codetermination rights: the management board could only 
                                                          
11 The Commission's remit is to investigate whether workplace productivity can be enhanced by 
greater labor-management cooperation and employee participation.  It also has the task to 
consider the impact of current labor law and collective bargaining practices on such 
cooperative efforts.  The Commission issued an interim, fact-finding report on June 2, 1994 
(see U.S. Department of Labor, 1994). 
12 For one such scenario involving mandatory "employee participation committees," see Weiler 
(1990). 
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proceed with its agreement with respect to rules on recruitment, vocational training, 
the fixing of terms of remuneration, measures relating to health and safety, and 
holiday schedules, inter al. The resemblance to German institutional forms and their 
obligations is readily apparent. 
Mandatory worker representation on supervisory boards was also proposed in 
1972 under the draft Fifth Directive on company law. Amendments to this directive 
were made in 1983 to take account of the reality of unitary board systems in some 
member states and to permit a somewhat wider menu of choice than worker directors 
alone. One such option included worker representation in a "separate body" akin to 
the German works council. Similar changes were introduced into the European 
Company Statute in 1989. In both cases, the participation as opposed to the 
information and consultation requirements of the proposed legislation were somewhat 
attenuated. Even so, neither proposal has yet entered the statute books.13  
As is well known, the EWC component of early variants of the European 
Company Statute was subsequently removed and made the subject of separate 
legislation. At the time of writing, the Council of the European Union has adopted a 
"common position" on a draft directive establishing multinational works councils in 
Community-scale undertakings, via the so-called social chapter route, and so the 
measure seems destined to pass into law during the German presidency. It will then 
join legislation on collective redundancies, which requires of employers somewhat 
wider information disclosure provisions than the 1975 law and contains language on 
the need to minimize layoffs while calling for "social measures," analogous to social 
plans in Germany (Sozialpläne), where these layoffs cannot be avoided. As further 
indications of the influence of the German model, we would note the particular 
worker consultation provisions of Community-level health and safety legislation, 
together with moves to increase employee information and consultation during the 
introduction of new technology under the social dialogue experiment.14 
Such imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. More recently, German works 
councils and that country's form of collective bargaining have also received 
intellectual benediction in the work of Freeman and Lazear (1993), even if they are 
cautious in recommending the exportation of works councils to previously 
decentralized bargaining regimes (see below). Freeman and Lazear argue that works 
councils be mandated since neither firms nor employees (nor for that matter union 
leaders) have adequate incentives to install them voluntarily. Works councils, so the 
argument runs, have the potential to increase the joint surplus of the enterprise, but 
                                                          
13 Our preceding evaluation of worker representation has omitted any discussion of the impact 
of worker directors - a tabular presentation of analogous research in this area is contained in 
Frick and Sadowski (1993).  Nevertheless, the controversy attaching to this form of 
codetermination, and to Montanmitbestimmung in particular, should at least be noted by 
foreign observers. 
14 For additional material on Community legislation and social policy in the European Union, 
including progress on all the measures cited above, see Addison and Siebert (1991, 1994, 
1995). 
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management will give them too little power and workers demand more power than is 
socially optimal. The key to the argument is that although total surplus is increased 
the firm's share will be reduced and the workers' share increased. (In effect, the 
authors have in mind a potential rather than an actual Pareto improvement.) Because 
workers will seek too much power for the council, Freeman and Lazear see much to 
commend the German industrial relations set-up because pay and fringes are 
determined outside the enterprise through industry-level bargaining and the strike 
weapon is foreclosed. 
The scope for improvement in joint surplus reflects the benefits of information 
exchange, consultation, and participation or codetermination. Information 
asymmetries underpin the need to mandate beneficial information exchange. The 
authors provide a simple theoretical model to indicate how management's use of the 
council as a communicator to workers about the state of nature can yield the optimal 
provision of effort on the part of workers, although they readily admit that they know 
of no specifically German evidence on such productive benefits of council-facilitated 
information flows. Similarly, councils are said to improve the communication from 
workers to management by increasing the incentives of the former to disclose private 
information now that workers have control over how that information will be utilized. 
Consultation and participation permit new solutions to the problems faced by the 
firm. The requirement is that the private information possessed by the worker side be 
valuable and hence admit of a better solution than can be reached by management 
alone. The cost takes the form of delays in decision-making, so that even in this 
model the case for councils does not follow automatically. That case, to repeat, 
hinges on new or creative solutions. Finally, codetermination on the German pattern 
by providing workers with increased job security is said to inculcate in workers a 
longer-run view of the prospects of the firm. (As was noted in section 2, disparate 
time horizons imply distortions even under efficient bargaining contracts.) 
Enough has been said to indicate that the German model of industrial relations is 
being taken very seriously outside the country at both practical and theoretical levels. 
Yet although the advantages of that system appear transparent to outside observers, 
the evidence reviewed in section 3 is opaque. Much the same is true of the broader 
literature on corporatism (see, for example, Schnabel, 1993). But, to mix literatures, 
disenchantment with the Swedish model has allowed Germany to assume the mantle 
of exemplar even at a time when its own institutions are coming under pressure and 
greater domestic scrutiny and when the works councils is being accorded a larger 
bargaining role through works agreements, inter al. 
At the level of theory, too, the case for mandates is being pressed with 
increasing vigor. Today, asymmetric information rather than the prior emphasis on 
monopoly and externalities is the cause célèbre justifying intervention in the market 
(e.g. Aghion and Hermalin, 1990; Addison, Barrett, and Siebert, 1994). Worker 
participation is simply one of the most recent additions to policy in this respect. But 
even abstracting from the vexed question of the specific content of a mandate (e.g. 
what are the exact powers to be set for the works council?), it is crucially important to 
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address the issue of whether the observed limited provision of a particular benefit 
stems from market failure or is instead a result of optimizing behavior in a situation 
of irreducible information deficiencies and inherent differences in the ability of the 
parties to commit.15 There is also the problem of assessing the consequences of 
"neutral" redistribution in all these models for capital investment and growth. That is 
to say, all too often interventionists are content with the conclusion that transfers are 
lump-sum. 
Finally, there is the issue of the portability of institutions across national 
boundaries. There is at least the suspicion that, despite the watering down of 
Community mandates under the social charter, the social affairs directorate of the 
European Commission still believes in setting mandates by reference to some 
best-practice standard. We have already commented on the role of Germany in this 
regard. But, as almost all students of works councils admit, councils operate in a 
particular context. Thus, Freeman and Lazear (1993, 28) are concerned to emphasize 
their analysis assumes that "the internal operation of councils is determined outside 
the enterprise." Similarly, Frick and Sadowski (1993, 31) caution: "Any attempt to 
implement mandatory works councils without simultaneously creating the necessary 
institutional structure neglects the interdependencies in the system of labor market 
institutions, nationally organized industry unions, government intervention and 
system of labor courts." In addition to institutional design, which can be copied, 
attention should be paid to the accompanying social norms and values, which cannot 
easily be transferred. The German institutional framework, of which works councils 
and nationally organized industry unions are a part, reflects a system of values that 
accords high priority to accommodation and integration as well as order and authority 
(Schregle, 1978, 88). It is this preference for cooperation over conflict that would 
appear at once to distinguish the German "model" and limit its applicability to other 
countries - in particular, to those countries with a history of adversarial relations. 
5. Conclusions 
The jury is still out on the question of the economic effects of German systems 
of worker representation. Industry-level studies do not point to positive union 
outcomes, but not only are there problems in determining union density at this level 
of aggregation but also conceptual difficulties in assigning efficiency effects. It is at 
the level of the workplace that the most clear-cut effects of worker representation are 
to be expected. Here, the most econometrically sophisticated studies (by FitzRoy and 
Kraft) consistently point to negative effects of works councils in sharp contrast to the 
predictions of the collective voice model. However, as we have also intimated, 
caution should be exercised in generalizing the FitzRoy-Kraft results given the 
samples from which they are derived. Other studies using more recent data and 
sometimes a larger sample of firms - but eschewing any attempt to model the 
                                                          
15 For an amplification of these points in the context of mandatory notice, see Chilton and 
Addison (1994). 
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determinants of the presence of a works council - do not provide such a consistent 
pattern of results along the various dimensions of firm performance. The balance of 
the evidence from these other firm-level studies is still not particularly favorable to 
works councils, although one study of innovative activity does detect a beneficial 
works council impact with the caveat that this is sensitive to the level of union 
density - beyond some critical level of workplace organization positive effects turn 
negative! As in the U.S. literature, there is very little indication of the practical 
manner in which works councils might produce pro-productivity effects: the two 
turnover studies we have identified reach opposite conclusions. 
But the disaggregative studies are all plagued by the problems of small sample 
size and their cross-section nature. Given the economist's inevitably parsimonious 
specifications, progress in analyzing the effects of workplace representation would 
seem to hinge on the development of larger samples and panel data. The extant 
attempts to endogenize works council status, though laudable, are inevitably subject 
to the criticism that they are superficial, ignoring potential differences between works 
councils, inter al. Failure to model the determinants of works council presence, on the 
other hand, runs headlong into problems of causation; difficulties that are 
underscored by the limited number of control variables deployed. 
We should also allude to the deficiencies of theory. These include, but are not 
restricted to, the unsettled issue of union goals (see Addison and Chilton, 1995), the 
tendency to regard efficient contracts as the end of the analytical story as far as 
dynamic efficiency effects are concerned, and the almost knee-jerk equation of 
limited provision of benefits (and participative institutions) with market failure - 
without sufficient regard being paid to modeling and parameterization. The 
limitations are themselves an inauspicious backdrop to empirical inquiry and policy. 
The bottom line is that the effects of German institutions of worker 
representation on economic outcomes are clouded. This elusiveness inevitably must 
mean that there are few if any immediate lessons of wider application in the German 
experience. Given the misleading and dangerous but perhaps understandable quest for 
exemplars (to which others should aspire) this pessimistic evaluation is not altogether 
without merit. 
References 
Addison, J.T./Chilton, J.B.: Can We Identify Union Productivity Effects? In: Industrial Relations 32 
(Winter 1993) p. 124-32. 
Addison, J.T./Chilton, J.B.: Models of Union Behavior. In: Handbook of Human Resource 
Management, edited by D. Lewin/D.J.B. Mitchell/M.A. Zaidi. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI 
Press, 1995 [forthcoming]. 
Addison, J.T./Hirsch, B.T.: Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run 
Arrived? In: Journal of Labor Economics 7 (January 1989) p. 72-105. 
Addison, J.T., Genosko, J./Schnabel, C.: Gewerkschaften, Produktivität und Rent Seeking. In: 
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 206 (March 1989) p. 102-16. 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 2. Jg., Heft 1, 1995__________________________________________________________43 
 
Addison, J.T., Kraft, K./Wagner, J.: German Works Councils and Firm Performance. In: Employee 
Representation: Alternatives and Future Directions, edited by B.E. Kaufman and M.M. 
Kleiner. Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1993, pp. 305-35. 
Addison, J.T./Barrett, C.R./Siebert, W.S.: Mandated Benefits and Asymmetric Information. 
Unpublished paper. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, May 1994. 
Addison, J.T./Siebert, W.S.: The Social Charter of the European Community: Evolution and 
Controversies. In: Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44 (July 1991) p. 597-625. 
Addison, J.T./Siebert, W.S.: Recent Developments in Social Policy in the New European Union. In: 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48 (October 1994) p. 5-27. 
Addison, J.T./Siebert, W.S. (eds.): Labor Market Harmonization in Europe: An Investigation of the 
Issues. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995 [forthcoming]. 
Aghion, P./Hermalin, B.: Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency. In: 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (Fall 1990) p. 381-409. 
Blinder, A.S. (ed.).: Paying for Productivity - A Look at the Evidence. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1990. 
Brown, C./Medoff, J.L.: Trade Unions in the Production Process. In: Journal of Political Economy 
86 (June 1978) p. 355-78. 
Büchtemann, C./Höland, A.: Befristete Arbeitsverhältnisse nach dem Beschäftigungs-
förderungsgesetz (BeschFG). Bonn: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1989. 
Chilton, J.B./Addison, J.T.: Nondisclosure as a Contractual Remedy: Explaining the Advance 
Notice Puzzle. Unpublished paper. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, June 1994. 
DeFina, R.H.: Unions, Relative Wages, and Economic Efficiency. In: Journal of Labor Economics 
1 (October 1983) p. 408-29. 
FitzRoy, F.R./Kraft, K.: Unionization, Wages and Efficiency - Theories and Evidence from the U.S. 
and West Germany. In: Kyklos 38 (1985) p. 537-54. 
FitzRoy, F.R./Kraft, K.: Efficiency and Internal Organization: Works Councils in West German 
Firms. In: Economica 54 (November 1987) p. 493-504. 
FitzRoy, F.R./Kraft, K.: Innovation, Rent-Sharing and the Organization of Labour in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. In: Small Business Economics 2 (1990) p. 95-103. 
Freeman, R./Lazear, E.P.: An Economic Analysis of Works Councils. Unpublished paper. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, February 1993. 
Freeman, R.B./Medoff, J.L.: What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books, 1984. 
Frick, B./Sadowski, D.: Works Councils, Unions, and Firm Performance: The Impact of Workers' 
Participation in Germany. In: Quint-Essenzen Nr. 35. Trier: Institut für Arbeitsrecht und 
Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, December 1993. 
Hirsch, B.T.: Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Firms. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. 
Upjohn Institute, 1991. 
Hirsch, B.T., Firm Investment Behavior and Collective Bargaining Strategy. In: Labor Market 
Institutions and the Future Role of Unions, edited by M.F. Bognanno and M.M. Kleiner. 
Oxford and Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992, pp. 95-121. 
Hirsch, B.T./Addison, J.T.: The Economic Analysis of Unions - New Approaches and Evidence. 
London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986. 
Kahn, L.M.: Unions and Cooperative Behavior. In: Journal of Labor Economics 11 (October 1993) 
p. 680-703. 
Kraft, K.: Exit and Voice in the Labor Market: An Empirical Study of Quits. In: Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142 (December 1986): 697-715. 
44______________________________Addison, Schnabel, Wagner: German Industrial Relations: An Elusive Exemplar 
 
Kraft, K.: Produktivitätswachstum und gewerkschaftliche Organisation. In: Jahrbücher für 
Nationalökonomie und Statistik 209 (1992) p. 419-30. 
Levine, D./Tyson, L.D.: Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environment. In: Paying for 
Productivity - A Look at the Evidence, edited by A. S. Blinder. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1990, pp. 183-237. 
Lorenz, W./Wagner, J.: Bestimmungsgründe von Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft und Organisations-
grad. In: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften 111 (1989) p. 65-82. 
Mainusch, S.: Die Gewerkschaft als Determinante von Producktivität und Profitabilität. 
Regensburg: Transfer Verlag, 1992. 
McDonald, I.M./Solow, R.M.: Wage Bargaining and Employment. In: American Economic Review 
71 (December 1981) p. 896-908. 
Metcalf, D.: Union Presence and Labour Productivity in British Manufacturing: A Reply to Nolan 
and Marginson. In: British Journal of Industrial Relations 28 (July 1990) p. 249-66. 
Metcalf, D.: Industrial Relations and Economic Performance. In: British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 31 (June 1993) p. 255-83. 
Schnabel, C.: Zur ökonomischen Analyse der Gewerkschaften in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1989. 
Schnabel, C.: Korporatismus, zentralisierte Tarifverhandlungen und makroökonomische 
Performance. In: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik 42 (1993) p. 259-72. 
Schnabel, C./Wagner, J.: Unions and Innovative Activity in Germany. In: Journal of Labor 
Research 8 (Fall 1992a) p. 393-406. 
Schnabel, C./Wagner, J.: Unions and Innovation. Evidence From German Micro Data. In: 
Economic Letters 39 (July 1992b) p. 369-73.  
Schnabel, C./Wagner, J.: Industrial Relations and Trade Union Effects on Innovation in Germany. 
Unpublished paper. Lüneburg: University of Lüneburg, 1993. [Forthcoming in: Labour 8 
(1994).] 
Schregle, J.: Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparative View. In: 
International Labour Review 117 (January/February 1978) p. 81-98. 
Schulenburg, J.-M. Graf v. d. and Wagner, J. (1991) Advertising, Innovation and Market Structure: 
A Comparison of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. In: 
Innovation and Technological Change: An International Comparison, edited by Z.J. Acs and 
D.B. Audretsch. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 160-82. 
United States Department of Labor.: Fact Finding Report. Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, May 1994. 
Warnken, J./Ronning, G.: Technological Change and Employment Structures. In: Technological 
Change and Employment, edited by R. Schettkat and M. Wagner. Berlin and New York: de 
Gruyter, 1990, pp. 215-53.  
Weiler, P.C.: Governing the Workplace - The Future of Labor and Employment Law. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
 
